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LILI-ANNE KIHN
Strategies, Decentralization, and
Controls in Internationalized
Finnish Firms1
ABSTRACT
Data collected from 103 senior managers from 60 internationalized Finnish firms suggests that, on
average, headquarters (HQs) have placed a very high weight on formal controls, and selected rela-
tively high degrees of decision-making decentralization and multidomestic strategy. The degree of
multidomestic (/global) strategy appears to partially impact the relative weight placed on controls in
the performance evaluation of overseas managers. While an indirect link is not detected through de-
centralization, a relatively small, but statistically significant direct link is found between the degree of
multidomestic (/global) strategy and the relative weight placed on financial (/operational and behav-
ioral) controls. This suggests that HQs may use controls to facilitate the implementation of a selected
strategy, even if the degree of decentralization is not influenced by the strategy
Key words: controls; decentralization; managerial performance evaluation; and multidomestic and
global strategies
LILI-ANNE KIHN, D.Sc. (Econ.)
Princeton, USA
1 This article is based on the author’s doctoral dissertation (Kihn 1997). The author thanks the two anonymous
reviewers for their useful comments and Liikesivistysrahasto for financing this article.
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INTRODUCTION
Studies on internationalized firms make an explicit distinction among various types of strate-
gies based on how various activities are coordinated and configured between headquarters
(HQs) and foreign subsidiaries (Porter 1986; Roth et al. 1991; and Roth 1992). While many
different strategies exist, prior surveys primarily support multidomestic and global strategies
(Roth 1992; and Leong and Tan 1993). When the configuration of various activities is geo-
graphically dispersed and the rate of coordination of these activities is low, there is a high
degree of multidomestic strategy. Conversely, when the configuration of various activities is
geographically concentrated and the rate of coordination is high, there is a high degree of a
simple global (hereafter global) strategy. (Porter 1986)
Management literature proposes that controls should be modified to the requirements of
specific strategies to lead to competitive advantage and superior performance (Lorsch et al.
1973; Dermer 1977; Doz 1986; Dyment 1987; Goold et al. 1987; Bartlett et al. 1989; Chand-
ler 1991; Anthony et al. 1992; and Hill et al. 1987, 1992). Our knowledge of the relations
between controls and strategies is still limited (Langfield-Smith 1997), although a few studies
have empirically supported direct links between controls and business strategies (Simons 1987),
and between controls and competitive strategies (Govindarajan & Gupta 1985; Govindarajan
1988; Govindarajan & Fisher 1990; and Ittner et al. 1997). Whether controls facilitate the exe-
cution of a selected strategy in a multinational setting is even less clear, due to a lack of em-
pirical findings.
This study takes the first step in this direction by first describing senior managers’ reliance
on formal controls, the degree of multidomestic (/global) strategies, and the degree of deci-
sion-making decentralization. Then a systematic analysis is conducted to determine whether
there are any links between senior managers’ use of controls and the degree of multidomestic
strategy either directly or indirectly through decentralized decision making. The empirical anal-
ysis is conducted in internationalized Finnish firms.2
The focus of this study is on formal controls. While internationalized firms tend to use a
combination of formal and informal control mechanisms3 (Jarillo& Martinez 1990; Bartlett and
Ghoshal 1989; and Marschan 1996), senior managers of internationalized Finnish firms have
been found to place a slightly higher importance on formal controls (Björkman & Lindqvist
1991).
2 Internationalized firms are defined as firms that have at least one foreign subsidiary with a greater than 50%
interest held by the parent company.  Internationalized industrial firms are required to have at least one foreign
manufacturing subsidiary.
3 Informal control mechanisms include, e.g., informal discussions, socialization of top managers, and corporate
culture.
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Since the interest in various types of performance measures has increased (Kaplan 1992),
this study analyzes senior managers’ reliance on formal controls on the basis of relative weights
(see Ittner et al. 1997 and Keating 1994) placed on financial, operational, and behavioral con-
trols.4 The focus of the study is on one of the key management control functions, notably on
the performance evaluation of overseas managers5 (who may include host country nationals
and expatriates, i.e., employees on foreign assignments).6 Figure 1 presents the framework of
this study.
The following are the key contributions of this study: First, the study provides such empir-
ical findings on the strategies and control practices of internationalized Finnish firms that should
be interesting to both researchers and business managers. Second, it extends the empirical
strategy-controls analysis to new strategy dimensions. While prior evidence is mostly on busi-
ness and competitive strategies, this survey focuses on Porter’s (1986) multidomestic and glo-
bal strategy dimensions.
Degree of
Multidomestic
Strategy
Relative Weight Placed
on Controls in the
Performance Evaluation
of Overseas Managers
Decentralization
FIGURE 1. The Research Framework.
4 Since management accounting literature does not provide any standard classification of various types of con-
trols, one was integrated for the purposes of this study on the basis of prior international accounting literature.
5 Subsidiary manager performance evaluation may differ from subsidiary performance evaluation, which is
beyond the scope of this study.
6 Whether expatriates are evaluated differently than host country nationals is beyond the scope of this study.
Tahvanainen (1998) has researched that question and found no difference in her case Nokia Telecommunications.
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The reminder of this study is organized in four sections. The first section defines the se-
lected variables (figure 1) and presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses to be tested.
The second section describes the sample, measures, and statistical methods. The third section
presents the empirical tests of the hypotheses. The conclusions, the limitations of the study,
and possible future research topics appear in the fourth section.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
It is generally accepted that controls are used differently in different firms (Otley 1980; Mer-
chant 1981; and Emmanuel et al. 1991). A series of studies suggests that some of the variation
in control practices may be explained by differences in strategies (Lorsch et al. 1973; Dermer
1977; Gupta et al. 1985, Doz 1986; Dyment 1987; Goold et al. 1987; Simons 1987, Bartlett et
al. 1989; Chandler 1991; Anthony et al. 1992; Hill et al. 1987, 1992, and Ittner et al. 1997). A
firm’s strategy is important because it may (either consciously or unconsciously) affect how
senior managers perceive various types of controls. While several factors probably influence
the performance evaluation of managers, the general consensus is that it should be based on
those controls that measure managers’ performance with a reasonable degree of accuracy and
objectivity.
Whether managers’ output or behavior can be measured more accurately should affect
the weight placed on various controls (Ouchi et al. 1975). If overseas managers’ contribution
to the financial output of their subsidiary or company can be assessed in a reasonably accu-
rate and objective way, senior managers are likely to find it more useful to place a high rela-
tive weight on profit management, i.e., on financial controls such as profit, return on invest-
ment (ROI), and residual income (RI). In other words, senior managers can consider financial
controls as a top priority for themselves, they can use financial controls to set meetings with
direct subordinates, they pay more attention to financial reports, they consider financial con-
trols to reflect whether managers are succeeding or failing, and they let financial controls af-
fect overseas managers’ rated performance (Simons 1987, 1994).
If overseas managers’ financial output cannot be assessed in a reasonably accurate and
objective way, senior managers will probably perceive that it is useful to place a high rela-
tive weight on operational output controls (e.g., market share, production volume, and qual-
ity) and/or behavioral controls (achieve cost budgets and production standards, propose ex-
penditure programs, follow rules and procedures, etc.).7 However, since managers’ percep-
7 The definition of behavioral controls used here is intended to be fairly narrow, because of the focus on formal
controls in a multinational setting. Note also, the following distinction made in this study: profit budgets are
included in financial control, but the achievement of cost budgets are included in behavioral control.
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tions differ, the selected practices may differ within each firm and similar firms (Borkowski
1990).
The link between the degree of multidomestic strategy and senior managers’ use of con-
trols can be either direct or indirect. Hypothesis 1 examines the direct link. It proposes that in
firms, which have a high degree of multidomestic (/global) strategy, senior managers find it
useful to place a high relative weight on financial (/operational and behavioral) controls such
as profits and ROI. This is, because, by definition, multidomestic strategy involves a low level
of senior managers’ coordination, which enhances the accurate and objective measurement of
the financial contributions of overseas managers.
Virtanen’s (1985) study on the 50 largest industrial firms in Finland found that managers’
performance evaluation was greatly influenced by financial results. The Björkman & Lindqvist
(1991, 118–119) survey conducted in 55 internationalized Finnish firms suggests that senior
managers use both financial and non-financial measures in assessing foreign subsidiaries, but
place more importance on the former.
While there is no empirical evidence on the relation between controls and multidomestic
strategy, Dyment (1987) proposes substantial use of profit and loss statements and balance
sheets in the management of locally coordinated multinational companies. Both Dyment (1987)
and the AAA’s Committee Report (1973) theorize that a profit center basis for performance
evaluation does not work well in globally integrated and coordinated companies. Dyment ar-
gues in favor of a few critical objectives, such as internally oriented, quantified, and time-
related statements of what must be accomplished to achieve the selected strategic excellence
position. The AAA’s Committee Report proposes evaluation via budget variances, non-finan-
cial quantitative measures, management and performance audits, and ”point systems”.
These normative arguments lead to the following hypothesis: There is a positive direct
link between the degree of multidomestic strategy and the relative weight placed on financial
controls in the performance evaluation of overseas managers.
Hypothesis 2 examines whether part of the association between strategy and senior man-
agers’ use of controls could be indirect through the effect of strategy on decentralized decision
making. While various structural forms exist in multinational companies, decentralized deci-
sion making is one of the key dimensions of less-hierarchical structures found in international-
ized firms.8 Decentralized decision making refers to the extent to which various decisions are
made by subsidiary managers rather than by senior managers in the parent company. Virtanen’s
(1984) survey of the 50 largest Finnish industrial enterprises suggests that divisional managers
8 According to Marschan (1996), the other dimensions of less-hierarchical structures are the delayering of orga-
nizational levels, dispersal of key functions across units in different countries, de-bureaucratization of formal
rules and procedures, and differentiation of work, responsibility and authority among subsidiary units.
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may have substantial operating autonomy, but restricted investment autonomy and centrally
coordinated financial decisions. A similar decision making pattern has been discovered among
the subsidiary managers of internationalized Finnish firms (Kihn 1996).
Various management studies find that organizational structure (often defined as the de-
gree of decentralization) is affected by various strategy dimensions (Chandler 1962; Stopford
et al. 1972; Rumelt 1974; Channon 1973; Dyas et al. 1976; Chenhall 1979; Suzuki 1980; Byrt
1981; Egelhoff 1988; and Hamilton et al. 1992). Furthermore, studies on internationalized firms
suggest that when the degree of multidomestic (/global) strategy increases, HQs find it useful
to delegate more (/less) decisions to foreign subsidiary managers (Doz 1986; Porter 1986; Dy-
ment 1987; and Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989).
A series of accounting studies suggest a relationship between decentralization and con-
trols, both in domestic firms (e.g., Gordon and Miller 1976; Dermer 1977; Waterhouse and
Tiessen 1978; Otley 1980; Virtanen 1985; Emmanuel et al. 1991; and Anthony et al. 1992)
and internationalized firms (Hawkins 1965; Mauriel 1969; Drake and Caudil 1981; and
Schweikart 1986). These studies propose that a higher (/lower) degree of decentralization pro-
vides overseas managers with greater (/less) responsibility over planning and controlling activ-
ities, and a greater (/less) influence on the financial performance of their subsidiaries. A clear-
cut dichotomy exists between foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, there is a close correlation be-
tween subsidiary activities and the responsibility of the subsidiary manager for these activities
(AAA 1973, 158). These conditions enhance more accurate and objective assessment of the
financial contribution of overseas managers. Senior managers tend to hold subsidiary manag-
ers accountable for their entity’s financial performance (Mauriel 1969; and Schweikart 1986).
Consequently, a profit center basis may be viewed as very useful for performance evaluation.
Hypothesis 2 expects that the degree of multidomestic strategy induces decentralization and,
the link between multidomestic strategy and senior managers’ relative weight placed on finan-
cial controls is, in part, due to the effects of decentralization.
METHOD
Sample
A population of 176 participants in 102 firms was initially identified on the basis of the follow-
ing criteria: 1) the respondents are responsible for the performance evaluation of overseas man-
agers and are Finnish speaking; 2) the firms are headquartered in Finland; 3) the firms have at
least one foreign subsidiary in which an over 50% interest is held by the Finnish parent com-
pany; 4) the industrial firms have at least one foreign manufacturing subsidiary, and 5) the
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firms are in the manufacturing, banking, and consulting sectors.9 The manufacturing firms were
selected on the basis of Mikkonen’s (1990) study, the consulting firms were selected based on
information received from the Finnish Association of Consulting firms, and banks were select-
ed on the basis of common knowledge.
Since the identified population was not very large for the purposes of survey research, a
mail questionnaire was administrated to the whole population in the spring of 1995 (see
Table 1, Panel A). Therefore, the selection of the target sample was not random. Since strat-
egies of complex multidivisional companies can be differentiated (Ghoshal and Nohria 1989),
and because the performance evaluation of overseas managers is likely to take place at the
divisional (or business group) level in multibusiness firms, the survey was expanded from
senior management at HQs to senior managers at divisions (or business groups) in diversi-
fied companies.10
The second column in Table 1, Panel A illustrates the identification process of the partic-
ipating executives. The questionnaire was sent directly to corporate directors in smaller firms
and to business group directors in multi-business firms. The directors were identified based on
telephone interviews and information derived from the annual reports.
To maximize the survey response rate, a slightly modified version of Dillman’s (1978)
Total Design Method was applied during the mail survey process. The initial questionnaire
request and three follow-ups yielded 103 (59%) usable, mail-returned questionnaires from about
60 firms. This response rate can be considered relatively high. The mail questionnaire collect-
ed data to measure the independent variables (strategy and decentralization) and the depend-
ent variable (relative weight placed on financial controls).
On average, the participants were 49 years old and had worked for their current compa-
ny 15 years. Of the participants 4.9% were females and 95.1% males. Eighty-six percent of the
respondents worked for a manufacturing firm, 10.8% for a consulting firm, and 3.9% for a
bank (see Table 1, Panel B for further details).
9 Management accounting studies often focus on manufacturing firms only.  Banking and consulting sectors
were added to the sample in this study because of relatively recent managerial performance problems in the
foreign units of some Finnish banks and in order to increase the sample size and the statistical power of the
results.
10 Another alternative could have been to analyze the scores of overseas managers. The indirect measurement
of the dependent variable (i.e., relative weight placed on financial controls by senior managers) would, how-
ever, have reduced the credibility of results.
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Analysis of the external validity and generalizability of the results
The external validity question is related to sampling theory and is concerned about whether
the research findings of a sample can be statistically generalized to a larger population (see
e.g., Jaeger 1990, 122–130; and Lähteenmäki 1992, 299). Since the selection of the target
sample was not random, this study made an attempt to analyze sample randomness ex post in
several ways.
TABLE 1. Sample Information.
Panel A: Sample Reduction Process Frequency Frequency of
of Firms Participants
Finnish f irms with at least one overseas subsidiary
with an over 50% interest held by the Finnish parent:
Manufacturing companies 083 154
Consult ing companies 016 016
Banks 003 006
102 176
Less: Nonrespondents,  because of
Merged f irms 008 000
Firms/divisions without active operations 001 002
Firms/divisions without active overseas operations 0v6 006
Firms with extensive restructuring 0v1 001
Firms/div.without Finnish speaking key person 0v1 009
Contact person not reached 0v2 006
= Actually quali fying target sample: 083 152
Less: Other non-respondents 023 048
= Respondents 060 104
Less: an outl ier 001
Actual sample 103
Panel B: Industry Information Frequency Percentage
– Metals 28 27.2
– Wood, paper,  or board 16 15.5
– Glass,  steal ,  etc. 9 8.7
– Consult ing 8 7.8
– Chemical 6 5.8
– Oil ,  coal,  or nuclear 6 5.8
– Plast ic 6 5.8
– Food, drink,  or tobacco 5 4.9
– Banking 4 3.9
– Texti le,  clothing, leather,  or shoes 3 2.9
– Furniture 3 2.9
– Electronics,  computer,  etc. 3 2.9
– Printing 1 1.0
– Mining 1 1.0
– Energy and water 1 1.0
– Not available 3 2.9
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First, an attempt was made to identify reasons for not responding. The questionnaire was
not returned by 72 respondents (i.e., in 41% of the cases). It was possible to identify reasons
for not responding in 42 cases.11 The identified reasons, although not necessarily comprehen-
sive, do not indicate a systematic bias in the actual sample.
Second, a series of statistical tests of essential and available key variables was conducted
to analyze whether the actual sample could be representative of the target sample. Since a
significant obstacle in this field is the lack of readily available and complete data sets, objec-
tive data was collected from various documentary sources (such as relevant 1989–93 annual
reports; company brochures; Lantto 1990–95; and Thilman 1990, 1992), and in a few cases;
directly from the respondents.
As shown in Table 2, Panel A, descriptive statistics were used to shed light on the fluctua-
tions between the participating and non-participating firms on a number of variables. Turno-
ver, 5-year average turnover, number of employees, and 5-year average number of employees
were used to indicate the size of the firms or divisions. Total frequency of foreign subsidiaries
and frequency of foreign subsidiaries on different continents were used as rough proxies of the
extent of the firm’s international business.
Next, whether the observed fluctuations between the two groups were small chance fluc-
tuations or sufficiently large differences was tested with a 2-sample t-test, which generally in-
dicates whether two samples have been drawn from different populations. The null hypothesis
(H0) tested was: There is no difference between the means of the actual and the non-respond-
ing sample; that is mu1- mu2 = 0. The alternative hypothesis (HA) was: There is a difference
between the means of the actual and the non-responding sample; that is mu1- mu2≠ 0. As the
final column in Table 2, Panel A illustrates, the conducted tests provided statistically insignifi-
cant values for all the listed variables at the 0.05 alpha level. This suggests an absence of
response bias in regards to size and extent of international businesses.
Finally, a goodness-of-fit-test, notably Chi-Square, was employed to analyze such cate-
gorical data as broad industrial sectors and sexes of respondents (see Table 2, Panels B and C).
The null hypothesis (H0) was: There is no difference between the probability of choosing the
actual sample and the probability of choosing the nonrespondent; that is p = q = 0.50. The al-
ternative hypothesis (HA) was: There is difference between the probability of choosing the ac-
11 As Column 2 in Table 1, Panel A shows, 24 (33% of) non-respondents from 19 firms did not actually qualify
to the survey for the following reasons: mergers, lack of active operations, lack of active overseas operations,
extensive restructuring, the appropriate contact person was not Finnish speaking, or the questionnaire did not
reach the qualifying contact person (due to layoffs, long-term illnesses, or organizational restructuring). More-
over, the following execuses were given for not responding by 18 (25% of) non-respondents during the follow-
up calls: Too busy (9), size of overseas operations too small (4), travelling a lot (3), not interested (1), and had
recently received too many mail questionnaires (1).
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TABLE 2. Analysis of the External Validity and Generalizability of the Results.
Panel A: Descriptive statist ics and two-sample t-tests for the quali fying targeted and actual
operating divis ions or f irms (N1=104, N2=152)
Mean Median Std Min Max Q1 Q3 N t
1993 Sales 2477 933 5546 15 49100 268 2869 89 1.54
(mFIM) 2193 946 4816 15 49100 271 2544 122
5-Year Avg. 2003 760 3540 0 22978 247 2220 70 1.02
Sales (mFIM) 1853 1010 3085 22 22978 286 2189 102
Number of 1954 1260 1903 57 8163 358 334 89 0.54
Employees 1892 1342 1778 57 8163 385 2929 116
5-Year Avg. 2060 1322 2061 29 8989 538 3231 62 0.14
No. of 2018 1400 1942 29 8989 593 3132 83
Employees
Foreign subsidiaries:
– total 9.20 4.5 11.1 1 58 2 11.3 94 0.05
9.16 4.5 12.3 1 65 2 11.0 135
– North 1.60 0.5 3.7 0 32 0 2. 94 1.26
– America 1.40 0.5 3.3 0 32 0 2. 135
– Europe 6.60 4.5 7.3 0 34 2 9. 94 –.18
– (excl.  Finland) 7.50 3.5 3.9 0 40 2 9. 135
– Asia 0.60 0.5 1.4 0 8 0 1. 94 –.23
0.60 0.5 1.7 0 13 0 0. 135
– Austral ia 0.30 0.5 1.0 0 9 0 0. 94 0.40
0.20 0.5 1.0 0 9 0 0. 135
– South 0.10 0.5 0.6 0 5 0 0. 94 –1.00
– America 0.20 0.5 1.3 0 14 0 0. 135
– Africa 0.00 0.5 0.2 0 1 0 0. 94 –0.79
0.10 0.5 0.4 0 4 0 0. 135
Panel B: The industries of the quali fying target sample and the actual precoded sample
Manufacturing Banking Consult ing Total
Frequency in f inal 132 5 15 152
target population
(Percentage) 86.84% 3.29% 9.87% 100%
Frequency among 90 4 7 101
coded participants
(Percentage) 89% 4% 7% 100%
Expected frequency 88 3 10 101
Chi-Square = SUM[(O-E)*(O-E)/E]
= (90–88)(90–88) + (4–3)(4–3) + (7–10)(7–10) = 1.279 n.s.
88 3 10
(continued)
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tual sample and the probability of choosing the nonrespondents; that is p ≠q ≠0.50. The data
suggests that all industry sectors and sex values are normally distributed in the sub-sample.
Therefore, the conclusion is that the statistical analysis of essential and available key variables
did not indicate any statistically significant differences at the 0.05 alpha level.
Measures
The relative weight placed on financial controls by senior managers was assessed with a five-
item five-point Likert scale. Since all possible controls (applied by the over 100 managers)
could not be identified and included in the measurement instrument, the following three types
of controls were included: financial controls (e.g., profit, ROI, and RI); operational output con-
trols (market share, production volume, quality, etc.); and behavioral controls (achieve pro-
duction standards and cost budgets, propose expenditure programs, follow rules and proce-
dures, etc.).
In line with Simons (1987, 1994) and Keating (1994), the respondents were asked to indi-
cate: 1) the importance of various types of controls, 2) the extent to which face-to-face meet-
ings are arranged on the basis of those controls, 3) the extent to which the controls reflect
successful management, 4) the extent to which the respondents pay attention to controls, and
5) the controls’ impact on managers’ rated performance. Each item was rated on a scale rang-
ing from (1) ”not at all important”(/”not at all”) to (5) ”very important”(/”very much”). After the
values of financial controls were divided by the values of operational output controls and be-
havioral controls for each of the five items, the obtained five values were averaged. Low val-
TABLE 2 (cont.)
Panel C: The sex distr ibution of quali fying targeted (152) and usable precoded responses
(101)
Female Male Total
Frequency in f inal 9 143 152
target population
(Percentage) 5.92% 94.08% 100%
Frequency among 6 95 101
coded participants
(Percentage) 5.94% 94.06% 100%
Expected 6 95 101
frequency
Chi-Square = (6–6)(6–6) + (95–95)(95–95) = 0 n.s.
6 95
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ues indicate a low relative weight on financial controls, and vice versa. For this measurement
instrument, the Cronbach (1951) alpha statistic of internal reliability of 0.83 was quite high.
Questions similar to Roth and Schweiger’s (1991) and Roth’s (1992) were selected to mea-
sure the degree of multidomestic strategy in terms of the coordination and configuration of
activities. In the first part, the executives were asked to assess the extent of senior managers’
coordination of 14 activities. In the second part, executives were asked to indicate the extent
to which the same 14 activities were performed at a single geographic location for the entire
company/business unit. Both parts had the same five-point scale ranging from (1) ”totally” to
(5) ”not at all”. Afterwards, the obtained values were coded in the following way: 1 = 5, 2 = 4,
3 = 3, 4 = 2, and 5 = 1. Then the values for each activity were summed and averaged by partici-
pant to provide an overall international strategy index, with low scores indicating a low (high)
degree of multidomestic (/global) strategy and vice versa. For this measurement instrument,
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.90.
The degree of decentralization was measured by applying a slightly modified version of
Vancil’s (1979) well-tested instrument, which is rooted in the famous Aston Group approach
(see Pugh et al. 1968; Merchant 1981; Chenhall and Morris 1986; and Keating 1994.). The
executives were asked to indicate ”to what extent decisions are delegated to overseas subsidi-
ary managers” on a five-point ordinal scale ranging from (1) ”not at all” to (5) ”totally”. After
the items were summed and averaged, the higher the score, the greater the autonomy of over-
seas subsidiary managers. For this instrument, the Cronbach alpha was 0.91.
Statistical methods
In contrast to prior theoretical and small sample studies, this study uses a relatively large sam-
ple and standard statistical methods best suited to analyze the strength of relations in a more
thorough and meaningful way. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the measured varia-
bles. Since the sample size is large enough, and all variables have unimodal and sufficiently
normal sample distributions, inferential statistics can be utilized in the data analysis.
TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables.
Mean Standard Theoretical Actual N
Deviation Range Range
Relative weight on 0.56 0.09 0.10–2.50 0.32–0.96 103
financial  controls
Degree of multidomestic 3.11 0.55 1–5 1.96–4.32 099
strategy
Degree of decentral ization 3.17 0.64 1–5 1.52–4.69 096
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TABLE 4. Zero-order Correlations among Variables.
Relative weight Degree of Multidomestic
Variables: placed on Strategy
Financial  Controls
1. 2.
1.  Relative weight placed on f inancial  controls: – –
2. Degree of multidomestic strategy 0.178* –
3. Degree of decentral ization: 0.168* 0.359***
*p < .05, **p < .01, and ***p < .005 (one-tai led test)
To test the direct effect of strategy on controls (hypothesis 1), standard Pearson’s correla-
tion coefficients (r) were used. Table 4 presents the results.
A path analysis (see e.g. Wright 1934; Neilimo 1975; and Chenhall et al. 1986) was used
to test the indirect effect on the relative weight placed on financial controls of the strategy
acting through decentralization (hypothesis 2). Figure 2 presents the path model. The degree
of multidomestic strategy is denoted X1, the degree of decision-making decentralization is X2,
and the relative weight placed on financial controls is X3. The residual variables (Rk) repre-
sent the unexplained variances of the intervening and independent variables.
FIGURE 2. The Research Model.
XI
The Degree of
Multidomestic
Strategy
X3
Relative Weight Placed
on Financial Controls
in the Performance
Evaluation of Overseas
Managers
X2
The Degree of
Decentralization
p3
2
R
k
R
k
p31
p21
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In the path model, the relationships among variables are specified by a series of path
coefficients (pij). Since the degree of multidomestic strategy is the only antecedent variable of
decentralization, path p21 is the zero-order correlation (i.e., r12) between the degree of multi-
domestic strategy and the degree of decentralization (see Table 3). The paths p31 and p32 are
equivalent to the standardized beta coefficient found by regressing X3 (the relative weight
placed on financial controls) on both X1 (the degree of multidomestic strategy) and X2 (the
degree of decentralization). The regression equation is:
X3 = (B31 * X1) + (B32 * X2) + (p3v * Rv)
Table 5 (Panels A and B) illustrates how the observed zero-order correlations and path
coefficients were decomposed into direct, indirect, and spurious effects. Table 5 (Panel C)
presents the path analysis findings.
TABLE 5. Path Analysis Method and Findings.
Panel A: Decomposit ion of Direct and Indirect Effects from the Path Analysis
Decomposit ion of Association:
Combination of Observed Direct Indirect Spurious
Variables Correlation Effect Effect Effect
X1 with X2 r12 = p21
X1 with X3 r31 = p31 + p32r12
X2 with X3 r23 = p32 + p31r12
Panel B: Decomposit ion of Path Coeff icients
Standard
Beta Coeff icient Value Error t p
Hypothesis 2:  Indirect effect
through decentral ization
p31 0.020 0.017 1.14 n.s.
p32 0.016 0.015 1.11 n.s.
R-sq(adj)=0.002; F=1.98; n.s.
Panel C: Decomposit ion of Effects
Direct Indirect Total
Effect Effect Spurious Effect
Hypothesis 2:
MultStrat/Decentral ization 0.359*** 0.359***
MultStrat/Relat.Fin.Cont. 0.020 0.006 0.026
Decentral ization/Relat.Fin.Cont. 0.016 0.007 0.023
*p < .05, **p < .01, and ***p < 0.01
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RESULTS
Results of Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the investigated variables from the 60 Finnish firms.
First, it describes the dependent variable. As Table 3 shows, 0.1 represents the lowest theoreti-
cally possible value and 2.5 the highest theoretically possible value for the index of relative
weight placed on financial controls. These results reveal that none of the firms is totally de-
pendent on financial or nonfinancial controls. The actual lowest value (0.32) indicates that a
higher weight is given to nonfinancial controls in some cases, whereas the highest value (0.96)
suggests that financial controls have a higher priority in some other firms. On average, the
weight placed on financial controls relative to operational and behavioral controls is 0.56.
A more detailed analysis pointed out that the senior managers rely heavily on all types of
examined controls. On average, financial controls seem to be most important (with a mean of
4.5, on a scale from 1 to 5), followed by operational output controls (mean 4.2) and behavio-
ral controls (mean 3.9).12 Since the absolute values are mostly very high, and the actual range
is quite small, it may be that real differences are not great across firms and that the five-point
measurement scale could not capture all variability.
The degree of multidomestic (/global) strategy was measured and coded on a scale from
one to five, with low values indicating a low (/high) degree of multidomestic (/global) strategy,
and vice versa. The results suggest that there is considerable variation among the international
strategies of Finnish firms. None of the firms applies either a purely multidomestic strategy or a
purely global strategy; the actual values range from 1.96 to 4.32. The mean value of the de-
gree of multidomestic strategy (3.11) exceeds the theoretical mean (2.5), indicating that, on
average, the internationalized Finnish firms apply a relatively high (/low) degree of multido-
mestic (/global) strategy.
The degree of decision-making decentralization receives a high actual range (from 1.52
to 4.69). The mean value (3.17) indicates that, on average, Finnish MNEs are relatively decen-
tralized in their decision-making. In other words, HQs and/or business group managers have
substantially decentralized several decisions to subsidiary managers.13
Results of the Direct Effect (Hypothesis 1)
The test of Hypothesis 1 examines the importance of a direct positive relationship between the
degree of multidomestic strategy and the relative weight placed on financial controls in the
12 For more details, please see Kihn (1996).
13 A further analysis conducted in Kihn (1996) suggests that in most cases the operative decisions (marketing,
hiring, the selection of vendors, etc.) are highly delegated to overseas subsidiary managers. Almost all firms have
centralized the more strategic decisions, such as investments and divestments. These results are not surprising.
They are in line with Virtanen (1984).
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performance evaluation of overseas managers. Table 4 presents the results of the zero-order
correlations for a one-tailed test.
As Table 4 indicates, the null hypothesis can be rejected. A positive and statistically sig-
nificant association (r = 0.178, p < 0.05) is obtained for the degree of multidomestic strategy
and the relative weight placed on financial controls. This result is not very strong, but it differs
enough from the chance expectation to warrant a belief that something other than chance is at
work. Accordingly, in this study a part of the variance in senior managers’ use of controls can
be explained by the degree of multidomestic strategy. The relative weight placed on financial
controls seems to follow the degree of multidomestic strategy.
Results of the Indirect Effect (Hypothesis 2)
Table 5 presents all the paths of the indirect effect. The theoretical expectation of Hypothesis
2 is that there is a positive indirect effect between the degree of multidomestic strategy and
financial controls acting through decentralization. Path p21, i.e., the relation between the de-
gree of multidomestic strategy and the degree of decentralization, is analyzed with zero-order
correlations. As Table 6, Panel C indicates, the degree of multidomestic strategy shows a posi-
tive and a statistically significant correlation (r = 0.359, p < 0.01) with the degree of decentrali-
zation. The paths p31 and p32 for the relative weight placed on financial controls are speci-
fied by the standardized beta coefficient discovered by regressing X3 (the relative weight placed
on financial controls) on X1 (the degree of multidomestic strategy) and on X2 (the degree of
decentralization). For decentralization, the obtained standardized regression coefficient for the
path linking the degree of multidomestic strategy to the relative weight placed on financial
controls (p31) is positive and insignificant. The path coefficient p32 is also positive, but insig-
nificant. These results suggest a lack of an indirect effect via decentralization and encourage
non-rejection of the null hypothesis.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Using data from 103 senior managers from about 60 Finnish MNEs, the study first describes
the degree of multidomestic (/global) strategy, decentralization, and relative weight placed on
financial, operational, and behavioral controls in internationalized Finnish firms. It then tests
two hypotheses to compare the importance of certain direct and indirect links between the
variables analyzed. The key contribution of this study is that it extends the strategy-control-
research to the analysis of the multidomestic and global strategy dimensions in international-
ized Finnish firms.
In line with Björkman & Lindqvist (1991), internationalized Finnish firms seem to place a
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high weight on all types of examined formal controls, with the highest weight on financial
controls. A high weight is also placed on the more subjective information. If these more sub-
jective criteria do not have a clear connection to profitability, they may lead managers to make
other than economic based decisions.
The findings also indicate that the internationalized Finnish firms do not have purely multi-
domestic or global strategies. On average, the internationalized Finnish firms apply a relative-
ly high degree of multidomestic strategy.
Regarding decision-making decentralization, it is obvious that while there is a consider-
able variation among the choices of Finnish firms, on average they have substantially decen-
tralized several decisions to overseas subsidiary managers. This finding supports Virtanen’s
(1984) results on the 50 largest Finnish industrial enterprises.
Consistent with the first hypothesis, the evidence of this study suggests a statistically sig-
nificant positive direct link between the degree of multidomestic strategy and senior manag-
ers’ relative weight placed on financial controls in the performance evaluation of overseas
managers. When the degree of multidomestic strategy increases, senior managers use all three
types of formal controls, but find it more useful to place a higher weight on financial controls
relative to operational and behavioral controls. Firms with a high degree of global strategy
place a lower weight on financial controls relative to operational and behavioral controls. This
finding supports the normative suggestions by AAA (1973), and Dyment (1987). However, the
detected correlation is quite small. This is probably because of measurement error and multi-
ple relationships.
The other hypothesis tests the importance of an indirect link between the degree of multi-
domestic strategy and the relative weight placed on financial controls. Using path analysis,
the data shows statistically insignificant support for the indirect link. This means that senior
managers’ relative use of controls generally follows the firm’s strategy even if they have not
structured their control systems in such a way that the degree of decentralization would be
influenced by the degree of multidomestic strategy.
The findings of this study should be evaluated in light of the following limitations. Only
selected types of formal controls were analyzed in the performance evaluation of overseas
managers. Only certain dimensions of strategy were analyzed (i.e., Porter’s multidomestic and
global dimensions). The respondents were senior level managers; overseas managers might
have responded differently. The applied statistical tests present evidence on empirical associa-
tions but not causal effects. Thus, statements about the direction of relations can only be made
in terms of the consistency of findings with the effects proposed in the theoretical discussion
(Chenhall et al. 1986). The findings are intended to describe internationalized Finnish firms,
not an individual firm. A given individual firm’s results may have been greatly affected by
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some special circumstances. Overall, the suggested contributions are still tentative in nature.
Despite these limitations, the findings of this macro level study suggest certain tendencies be-
tween strategy and controls in internationalized Finnish firms.
In addition to improving definitions and measurement instruments, the scores of senior
managers and overseas subsidiary managers could be compared to highlight possible macro-
and micro-level differences in the strategies and control mechanisms of various subsidiaries.
Even if it may be difficult, the effectiveness of Porter’s strategy and control mix combinations
could be researched. Ideally, such an approach could enhance our ability to understand what
kind of control mix is effective in different strategy conditions and, as a result, improve the
likelihood that formal controls will help managers improve their performance and that of their
firm. Further research could also be directed at analyzing relations between other control and
strategy dimensions. The combination of economic, contingency, and behavioral factors that
are likely to impact managerial performance evaluation practices could be further explored. j
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APPENDIX 1: The English Version of the Survey Questions. (The original survey was in Finnish).
1a. How important do you perceive each of the following three
types of controls to be in the evaluation of overseas
managers? (Please circle the appropriate number
on the 5-point scale below).
Not At All Of Little There Quite Very
Important Importance Between Important Important
FINANCIAL CONTROLS (e.g., profit,
return-on-investment, and residual income) ........................ 1 2 3 4 5
OPERATIONAL OUTPUT CONTROLS (market
share, quality, production volume, etc.) .............................. 1 2 3 4 5
BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS (e.g., achieve cost
budgets & production standards, follow rules &
procedures, and propose expenditure programs) ................. 1 2 3 4 5
1b. How often do you arrange meetings with overseas managers
to discuss their performance on the following types
of controls? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = only if the
performance is significantly below expectations,
4 = quite often, and 5 = regularly).
FINANCIAL CONTROLS ....................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
OPERATIONAL OUTPUT CONTROLS ................................ 1 2 3 4 5
BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS ................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
1c. To what extent do the following three types of
controls reflect whether overseas managers are
succeeding or failing with the business?
Not At All A Little Some Quite Very
what much much
FINANCIAL CONTROLS ....................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
OPERATIONAL OUTPUT CONTROLS ................................ 1 2 3 4 5
BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS ................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
1d. How much attention do you pay to periodic (i.e.,
weekly or monthly) reports of results based on
the following types of controls, when you evaluate
the performance of overseas managers?
FINANCIAL CONTROLS ....................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
OPERATIONAL OUTPUT CONTROLS ................................ 1 2 3 4 5
BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS ................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
1e. How much impact do good or bad results measured in
the following types of controls have on the rated
performance of overseas managers?
FINANCIAL CONTROLS ....................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
OPERATIONAL OUTPUT CONTROLS ................................ 1 2 3 4 5
BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS ................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
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2a. To what extent have senior managers coordinated
the following activities?
Not At All A Little Some Very Totally
what much
Production of parts and products (/services) ........................ 1 2 3 4 5
Sales activities management ................................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Procurement of raw materials and parts ............................... 1 2 3 4 5
Marketing .............................................................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Product (/service) development ............................................ 1 2 3 4 5
Technology (service process) development .......................... 1 2 3 4 5
Accounting and legal activities ............................................ 1 2 3 4 5
Government and public relations ......................................... 1 2 3 4 5
Human resource .................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
Product distribution .............................................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Customer service ................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
Product promotion and advertising ...................................... 1 2 3 4 5
Information systems and data processing ............................. 1 2 3 4 5
Capital raising and management .......................................... 1 2 3 4 5
2b To what extent are the following activities ..........................
centralized into one geographic location?
Not At All A Little Some Very Totally
what much
Production of parts and products (/services) ........................ 1 2 3 4 5
Sales activities management ................................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Procurement of raw materials and parts ............................... 1 2 3 4 5
Marketing .............................................................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Product (/service) development ............................................ 1 2 3 4 5
Technology (service process) development .......................... 1 2 3 4 5
Accounting and legal activities ............................................ 1 2 3 4 5
Government and public relations ......................................... 1 2 3 4 5
Human resource .................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
Product distribution .............................................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Customer service ................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
Product promotion and advertising ...................................... 1 2 3 4 5
Information systems and data processing ............................. 1 2 3 4 5
Capital raising and management .......................................... 1 2 3 4 5
3. To what extent are the following decisions made ................
by overseas managers?
Not At Al A Little Some Very Totally
what much
Discontinuing a major existing product or product line. ..... 1 2 3 4 5
Redesigning products for a major existing product line ....... 1 2 3 4 5
Expanding into new marketing territories for existing
products ................................................................................ 1 2 3 4 5
Developing a major new product line .................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Buying from an outside vendor when the items required
could be supplied by another unit in your corporation ....... 1 2 3 4 5
Selecting an outside vendor to supply an important raw
material or component used in operations ........................... 1 2 3 4 5
Selecting the vendor to supply major components for an
approved capital expenditure project. ................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Hiring a consultant for assistance in developing or
modifying operating systems ................................................ 1 2 3 4 5
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Hiring a consultant for special studies ................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Increasing the planned level of expenditures for an
advertising project ................................................................ 1 2 3 4 5
Changing the selling price on a major product .................... 1 2 3 4 5
Changing the policy governing the level of investment
in inventories ........................................................................ 1 2 3 4 5
Increasing the number of personnel employed in their units 1 2 3 4 5
Increasing the number of non-exempt personnel
employed in their units ........................................................ . 1 2 3 4 5
Promoting one of their lower-level managers to a higher
position ................................................................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Firing one of their direct subordinates ................................. 1 2 3 4 5
Hiring a new person from outside ........................................ 1 2 3 4 5
Determining the size of a bonus to be paid to a direct
subordinate. .......................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5
